WAYS TO SOLVE AGENCY PROBLEMS IN CORPORATE STRUCTURES WITH USING ACCOUNTING INFORMATION: NON-INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.37332/2309-1533.2019.7-8.21Keywords:
Key words, corporate governance, agency problem, adverse selection, moral hazard, accounting information.Abstract
Tsaruk V.Yu. WAYS TO SOLVE AGENCY PROBLEMS IN CORPORATE STRUCTURES WITH USING ACCOUNTING INFORMATION: NON-INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
Purpose. The aim of the article is to analyse and substantiate the ways to solve the consequences of an agency problem in corporate structures based on the use of accounting information.
Methodology of the research. The theoretical basis of the research is the scientific works of domestic and foreign scientists on the problems of accounting information formation in the issues of solving agency problems in corporate structures. The following methods are used to achieve the goal of the study: general scientific methods (abstraction, comparison, generalization, analysis, synthesis) – to know the basic elements of accounting information; critical analysis and systematic approach – when disclosing the characteristics of the main elements of solving an agency problem in corporate structures; abstract and logical method – to formulate the conclusions of the study.
Findings. The types of opportunistic behaviour regarding the moment of contracting according to agency theory are substantiated. The role of accounting information at the pre-contractual stage of activity of corporate structures is determined. The features of understanding of accounting as one of the basic elements of the corporate governance system, which allows to minimize the consequences of an agency problem, are revealed. The role of accounting information at the post-contracting stage of corporate structures activity is determined.
Originality. The possibility of using accounting information for the implementation of opportunistic behaviour by agents in the activity of corporate structures is substantiated. The ability of the accounting system to counteract the hidden intentions that agents may have after contracting has been identified. A matrix classification of approaches to solving the consequences of agency problems in corporate structures has been developed.
Practical value. Implementation of the components of accounting information proposed in the study will allow to substantiate the role of accounting information in the application of each of the selected approaches to solving the consequences of the agency problem in corporate structures.
Key words: corporate governance; agency problem; adverse selection; moral hazard; accounting information.
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